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Distributed quantum communication and quantum computing offer many
new opportunities for quantum information processing. Here networks
based on highly nonlocal quantum resources with complex entanglement
structures have been proposed for distributing, sharing and processing
quantum information. Graph states in particular have emerged as pow-
erful resources for such tasks using measurement-based techniques. We
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report an experimental demonstration of graph-state quantum secret
sharing, an important primitive for a quantum network. We use an all-
optical setup to encode quantum information into photons representing
a five-qubit graph state. We are able to reliably encode, distribute and
share quantum information between four parties. In our experiment we
demonstrate the integration of three distinct secret sharing protocols,
which allow for security and protocol parameters not possible with any
single protocol alone. Our results show that graph states are a promising
approach for sophisticated multi-layered protocols in quantum networks.
Introduction
The potential benefits of quantum information processing in a connected world are
now well established: while the algorithmic speedups offered by quantum comput-
ers1 and the security provided by quantum key distribution2 are outstanding im-
provements over what is classically achievable, in recent years many new protocols
have emerged in the setting of quantum networks3. Examples of these protocols
include quantum coin flipping4–7, blind quantum computation8,9 and distributed
and secure quantum computation10,11. In this work we investigate the important
networking protocol of quantum secret sharing12,13 - which allows one party to
distribute a secret (classical or quantum) to a network of parties, such that only
authorised sets of parties can access the secret and unauthorised sets obtain no in-
formation. Secret sharing has many applications in network-based scenarios, such
as auctioning, remote voting, money transfer and multiparty secure computation.
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The first classical protocols for secret sharing were introduced in 1979 by Shamir14
and Blakely15, with quantum versions later developed using quantum channels for
sharing both classical and quantum secrets12,13. Most recently, however, secret shar-
ing protocols have been unified under the framework of graph states16–18 - quantum
resources that can be used to share both classical and quantum secrets. One of
the most promising features of graph-state based quantum secret sharing is the
natural capacity of the resource states to be integrated into more complex network-
ing protocols. Indeed, graph states are also the basis for universal measurement-
based quantum computation19–24, error correction25–31 and blind quantum com-
putation8,9, making them versatile resources for distributed quantum information
processing.
In this work we report an experimental demonstration of graph-state based
sharing of classical and quantum secrets using photons in a linear optics setup.
We show how a five-qubit graph state can be used for sharing a classical secret
amongst four parties using quantum channels (CQ) - secure against a distrusted
channel between the dealer (the party that shares the secret) and the four parties.
We also outline and demonstrate three protocols of increasing sophistication that
allow the same five-qubit graph state to be used to share a quantum secret with
quantum channels (QQ). By combining the classical Shamir-Blakely protocols14,15
with CQ and schemes for sharing quantum secrets recently introduced in refs.16,17,32
we demonstrate the sharing of a quantum secret over an access structure impossible
with QQ alone, which is certified as secure against distrusted channels between the
dealer and the other parties (also impossible with QQ alone). We thus demonstrate
the practical potential of graph-state quantum secret sharing, as well as the capacity
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for integrating several cryptographic protocols in this setting. Previous experiments
on quantum secret sharing have concentrated on sharing classical secrets33–37, with
some work regarding the sharing of quantum secrets amongst three players38–42.
However, our work goes beyond these previous works in two crucial aspects. First,
the quantum secret sharing is performed using graph states, which are of great
importance for the integration of secret sharing with a wide range of quantum net-
working protocols via the measurement-based paradigm. Second, we have combined
three different cryptographic protocols, one classical and two quantum to enable the
sharing of a quantum secret which would not have been possible with any one of
the protocols alone, thus demonstrating the ability of graph states to allow the
hybridisation of classical and quantum protocols. The results of our experimental
demonstration and their analysis show some of the key advantages of using graph
states for quantum communication protocols in future quantum networks.
Results
Resource characterization
The setup used to demonstrate graph-state quantum secret sharing is shown in Fig-
ure 1 a and generates the five-qubit graph state shown in Figure 1 b, which acted
as a resource state for carrying out the protocols. In the graph state there is initial
entanglement between the dealer’s qubit (centre qubit) and that of each of the four
parties, or players (the outer qubits). The state was generated using the method
described in ref.43, where a birefringent photonic crystal fibre (PCF) generates a
polarization-entangled pair of photons in the state 1√
2
(|H〉 |H〉 + |V 〉 |V 〉), with H
4
and V referring to horizontal and vertical polarization. The entangled photons are
generated at non-degenerate signal and idler wavelengths of 625nm and 860nm. A
second PCF generates heralded single photons at the signal wavelength (see Meth-
ods). Both PCF sources were pumped by the same pulsed laser. The signal photons
from the two PCF sources were then overlapped at a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS)
to perform a postselected fusion operation44, leaving a three-photon entangled GHZ
state 1√
2
(|HHH〉+ |V V V 〉). This state can be converted by local operations to a
linear graph state 1√
2
(|+0+〉+ |−1−〉), where the single-qubit computational basis
states |0〉 and |1〉 are encoded as horizontal and vertical polarizations, and therefore
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) are encoded as diagonal and anti-diagonal plane polarizations.
These 45◦ rotations are applied to the two signal photons emerging from the PBS
fusion operation using half-wave plates (HWP).
Additional qubits are then added to the linear graph state by expanding the
signal photons into two paths in displaced Sagnac interferometers, with the extra
degree of freedom associated with the path of the photon corresponding to a qubit
in each interferometer. The beamsplitters used in the interferometers are hybrids,
with half of their surface a PBS and the other half a 50:50 beamsplitter (BS). The
signal photons are input through the PBSs, so that their paths are correlated with
their polarizations and the graph state is extended by a qubit at each end, creating a
five-qubit linear graph. This is equivalent to the resource state shown in Figure 1 b
up to local complementation operations43, which are carried out using additional
waveplates and a relabelling of the interferometer paths to the Pauli X basis (see
Methods). The five-qubit graph state generated in the experiment and shown in
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Figure 1 b is given explicitly by
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
√
2
[ |−y〉0 ( |+ + 0〉 |−y〉 − i |+ + 1〉 |+y〉+ i |− − 0〉 |−y〉+ |− − 1〉 |+y〉 )1234
+ |+y〉0
( |+ + 0〉 |+y〉+ i |+ + 1〉 |−y〉 − i |− − 0〉 |+y〉+ |− − 1〉 |−y〉 )1234], (1)
where the eigenstates of the Pauli Y operator are |±y〉 = 1√2 (|0〉 ± i |1〉). To measure
the path qubit in the Pauli X basis, one path or the other is blocked inside the
interferometer. To measure in the Y or Z basis, the paths are allowed to recombine
at the BS surface with different relative phases. The polarization qubits are then
measured using quarter-wave plate (QWP) - HWP - PBS chains, followed by silicon
avalanche photodiode detectors (APDs), which enable any Pauli basis measurement
to be performed45.
We first checked the entanglement of the graph state using an entanglement
witness46. In this case, it is possible to detect genuine multipartite entanglement
(GME) in a linear cluster state using the correlations from only two local measure-
ment bases. Since the five-qubit graph state is locally equivalent to a five-qubit
linear cluster state, by making corresponding changes to the reference frames of the
measurements we obtain the relevant witness (see Methods). The measurements are
X0X1X2X3X4 and Y0Z1Y2Y3Z4, which lead to a witness value of 〈W〉 = −0.15±0.03.
The error is calculated using a Monte Carlo method with Poissonian noise on the
count statistics45. The negative expectation value of the witness reveals the pres-
ence of GME and confirms that all qubits are involved in the generation of the graph
state. We also obtain the fidelity of the experimental graph state with respect to
the ideal case using seventeen measurement bases (see Methods) and find a fidelity
of F = 0.70± 0.01.
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Having characterised the resource state, we move on to testing its performance
in carrying out secret sharing protocols. We consider qubit 0 to belong to the
dealer, and qubits 1, 2, 3 and 4 to players 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. It can be seen
from Eq. (1) that the graph state is a maximally entangled state between the dealer
and the players. Thus, its use for secret sharing can be thought of as analogous to
the way a maximally entangled state is used for two player communication. When
using it to share a classical secret, a random key can be established between the
dealer and authorised sets of players, similar to entanglement-based quantum key
distribution (QKD)32. On the other hand, when using it to share a quantum secret
it can be thought of as the entangled resource for teleporting a secret state from the
dealer to the players. In both cases the shape of the graph state imposes restrictions
on which sets of players can access the secret, giving the overall access structure for
the secret sharing.
Classical secret sharing (CQ)
In the CQ protocol the graph state in Eq. (1) is used to establish a random key
which can be known only by the dealer and an authorised set of players12,16. In this
sense it is similar to a secret key generation protocol: once the key is established it
can be used to securely communicate between the dealer and the authorised set of
players, even in the presence of eavesdroppers (making it an improvement on the
Shamir-Blakely schemes14,15, which require trusted channels). We will see that it
also can be used as a subprotocol for secure QQ. As in entanglement based QKD,
the players both measure in randomly chosen complementary bases, the correlations
are then checked, and if sufficiently high the key can be trusted.
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The dealer starts by measuring their qubit either in the Pauli Y or Z basis,
chosen at random. Here, the state in Eq. (1), which is written in the Y basis for
the dealer, can also be written in an alternative form with the dealer’s qubit in the
Z basis as
|Ψ〉 = 1
2
√
2
[ |0〉0 ( |+ + 0〉 |0〉+ |+ + 1〉 |1〉+ |− − 0〉 |1〉+ |− − 1〉 |0〉 )1234
+ |1〉0
( |+ + 0〉 |1〉+ |+ + 1〉 |0〉 − |− − 0〉 |0〉+ |− − 1〉 |1〉 )
1234
]
. (2)
Thus, the dealer’s measurement projects the players’ state into one of four states
ρi,j1234, where j = (Z, Y ) represents the dealer’s basis choice and i = (0, 1) the
dealer’s measurement result, which can easily be calculated from Eqs. (1) and (2).
The dealer’s result is used as the secret key and the task of the players is to make
measurements to discriminate the states ρi,j1234 and find i. They cannot do this
perfectly without knowledge of the basis choice j, so they make choices based on
a guess j′ for the basis used by the dealer. As in standard QKD, after the players
measure their state, the basis choice j is announced by the dealer. If the players’
measurements were chosen differently, i.e. j′ 6= j, the results are discarded and a
sifted key is built up using the cases where the bases of the dealer and the players
coincided. For a given basis choice j, a set of players is ‘unauthorised’ if there is no
measurement they can make to find i, and a set of players is ‘authorised’ if they are
able to perfectly find i using a particular choice of measurement. Further details of
the protocol and proof of security can be found in refs.16,32.
To check whether a set of players B using the five-qubit graph state can access
the secret it is necessary to look at their reduced states ρi,jB given the dealer’s result
i and basis choice j. For a particular basis j, the dealer is essentially encoding the
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classical information about their result i into the state ρi,jB , chosen with probability
pi,j - the probability the dealer obtains result i when measuring basis j. We denote
this encoding of classical information as j. To quantify how well a set of players
can access the dealer’s results we then use the accessible information32
χ(j) = S(ρ
j
B)−
∑
i
pi,jS(ρ
i,j
B ) (3)
where S(ρ) is the von Neuman entropy of state ρ and ρjB = p0,jρ
0,j
B + p1,jρ
1,j
B . This
quantifies the maximum possible information that the players can obtain about
the dealer’s results for a given basis choice j. When χ(j) is zero there is no
information that the players can obtain about the dealer’s result, no matter which
measurements they make. It can be shown (see Methods) that using the state in
Eq. (1) a single player cannot obtain any information about the dealer’s result.
That is, their reduced density matrix is independent of the dealer’s result i, for
both bases j. In Figure 2 we have measured the reduced density matrices for
each player (for each of the dealer’s results) from the graph state generated in our
experiment to obtain the accessible information χ. One can see from Figure 2 a and
2 b that the accessible information about the dealer’s results are very close to zero
for both the Z and Y bases, confirming that individual players have almost zero
information about the dealer’s results. When the dealer’s result is not taken into
consideration the fidelities of the single player reduced density matrices with respect
to a maximally mixed state I/2 are F = 0.961± 0.005, 0.996± 0.002, 0.998± 0.001
and 0.996 ± 0.002 for players 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. When the dealer’s result
is taken into consideration, the 4 possible states for each player remain close to the
maximally mixed state and lead to the low values of accessible information shown
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in Figure 2.
For pairs of players, there are two cases, with the amount of information acces-
sible different if the pair are adjacent: (1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 3) and (2, 4), or diagonally
opposite: (1, 2) and (3, 4). It can easily be shown that a given pair of adjacent
players cannot obtain any information about the dealer’s result from the state in
Eq. (1) (see Methods). One can see from Figure 3 a and 3 b that the accessible
information about the dealer’s results are very close to zero for both the Z and Y
bases using the graph state generated in our experiment, confirming that adjacent
pairs of players have almost zero information about the dealer’s results. On the
other hand, when a pair of players are at opposite corners, it can be shown using
Eqs. (1) and (2) that when the dealer measures in the Z basis they obtain no in-
formation, but when they measure in the Y basis they obtain full information. For
example, pair (3, 4) could do this by measuring in the bases Z3 and Y4. If the results
are correlated, the dealer’s result would be 1, if they are anti-correlated it would be
0. Similar conclusions can be found for the pair (1, 2). One can see from Figure 3 c
and 3 d that the measured accessible information about the dealer’s results are very
close to zero for the Z basis, but not the Y basis, confirming that opposite pairs of
players can access information about the dealer’s results.
Finally, for any three players it can be shown that in the ideal case they can
access the dealer’s measurement result perfectly for both the Z and Y bases. For
example, if the dealer measures in the Y basis, the triplet of players (1, 2, 4) can
obtain the result by measuring in the bases Z2 and X4 with the result of the dealer’s
outcome obtained from the measurement of player 1 in the Y basis (after feedfor-
ward operations Xs2(XZ)s4Z are applied, where si = (0, 1) is the outcome of the
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measurement of qubit i). This also holds for the Z basis of the dealer. These re-
sults can easily be checked by inspection of Eqs. (1) and (2). The same retrieval
process holds for any triplet of players by symmetry. The correlations within the
graph state can therefore be used to establish a shared random key between the
dealer and any set of three players. In Figure 4 we show the measured quantum
bit error rates (QBERs) for generating a shared random key for the four possible
triplets of players: (1, 2, 3), (1, 2, 4), (2, 3, 4) and (1, 3, 4). The result of the dealer is
obtained from the measurement of a designated player’s qubit. Once the measure-
ment basis is chosen, a non-zero QBER p represents the action of the superoperator
E (j)(ρi,jB ) = pρi⊕1,jB + (1 − p)ρi,jB . It is not difficult to see that for p = 50% the ac-
cessible information will be zero, irrespective of ρi,jB . One can see that the QBERs
are low when the dealer and designated player measure in the same basis and close
to 50% when they use a different basis - corresponding to completely uncorrelated
results. Taking the QBERs from both the Z and Y bases, when the dealer and des-
ignated player measure in the same bases, we almost reach the 11% bound needed
to establish a secure random key2. We obtain 14 ± 2%, 16 ± 2%, 18 ± 2% and
15 ± 2% for the triplets (1,2,3), (1,2,4), (2,3,4) and (1,3,4) respectively. Although
our QBERs are just above the secure bound, the results demonstrate a first proof-
of-principle for secure QKD with the access structure of the graph state. Note that
in our experiment the players do not necessarily correspond to separate photons,
as we are making use of hyperentanglement47. This means that qubits (or players)
one and two are embodied by one photon, and qubits three and four by another.
For a pair of players that share a single photon, one can split up the access sets into
their original form by allowing one player to control the measurement setting and
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readout of the path qubit, and the other to control the setting and readout of the
polarization qubit.
In summary, using the graph state generated in our setup to share classical
information via quantum channels (CQ) we have demonstrated a secret sharing
scheme where a secret is distributed across four players such that any three can
access the secret and any single player obtains no information. This is known as a
ramp scheme with parameters (3, 1, 4). Here, a ramp scheme (k, k′, n) enables the
parameterising of any secret sharing scheme over n players such that any set of k or
more players have perfect access to the secret and any set of k′ or fewer players have
no access to the secret. If k′ = k − 1, then the scheme is called a (k, n) threshold
scheme.
Quantum secret sharing (QQ)
We now show that our generated graph state can also be used to implement a
(3,1,4) ramp scheme for sharing a quantum secret using the method described in
ref.16. Furthermore, we also show how this ramp scheme can be upgraded to a (3,4)
threshold scheme via hybrid quantum secret sharing (using both classical and quan-
tum secret sharing)48,49. That is, any three players can access the quantum secret,
but any fewer cannot. This is known to be impossible using a qubit pure quantum
secret sharing protocol alone, i.e. without some classical mixing16,32. Finally, we
introduce and demonstrate a protocol which allows the sharing of a quantum secret
over untrusted quantum channels between the dealer and the players.
In the QQ protocol a quantum state |ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 (the quantum secret) is
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encoded by the dealer onto the following four-qubit state shared by the players
|Φ〉 = α|φ〉1234 + β|φ′〉1234, (4)
where |φ〉1234 = 1/2(|+ + 00〉 + |+ + 11〉 + |− − 01〉 + |− − 10〉)1234 is a square
graph state and |φ′〉1234 = Z1Z2Z3Z4|φ〉1234. The dealer achieves this encoding by
teleporting in their secret state via a Bell measurement of the joint state of |ψ〉 and
qubit 0 of the graph given in Eq. (1)32,50. Alternatively, the dealer can directly
prepare qubit 0 of the graph in the secret state α|0〉0 + β|1〉0 and measure it in the
X basis with the feedforward operation (Z1Z2X3I4)
s0 applied. In our experiment
we implement this latter more compact approach for encoding the secret. The task
of a set of players is then to access the secret quantum information.
In order to quantify the amount of information that can be accessed by a set
of players B we use the quantum mutual information of the reduced state shared
by the dealer and the set of players, ρ0,B
50, which is given by
I(ρ0,B) = S(ρ0) + S(ρB)− S(ρ0,B), (5)
where ρ0 and ρB are the reduced states of the dealer and players respectively. If
I(ρ0,B) is zero, the players obtain no information about the quantum secret. For any
single player it can be shown that the encoding in Eq. (4) leads to a reduced density
matrix that is maximally mixed, independent of the secret input qubit. In Figure 5
we have used quantum process tomography and treated the mapping between the
dealer and each player as a quantum channel for the secret qubit to be transferred
over. Here, four probe states are used for the dealer’s secret qubit, |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and
|+y〉, which enable the reconstruction of the final Bloch sphere obtained by each of
the players. One can see from Figure 5 that using our generated graph state, all of
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the dealer’s secret qubit states are transferred to states close to the maximally mixed
state for the players. Furthermore, the measured mutual information between the
dealer and each player, given in the caption, is consistently close to zero. Thus, a
single player acting alone cannot obtain any information about the shared quantum
secret.
For pairs of players the situation changes with regards to the amount of acces-
sible information. When the players are adjacent, they obtain no information in the
Z-Y plane of the secret qubit’s Bloch sphere, but can extract information in the Z-
X and X-Y planes (see Methods). In Figure 6 a-c we show the experimental results
from the player pair (1,4). Here, we plot the fidelity between the players’ two-qubit
state and fixed states as the dealer varies the angles in the respective planes of the
Bloch sphere for their secret qubit. The fidelity gives an indication of how the state
of the pair changes based on the dealer’s input state. In Figure 6 a the fixed state
is I/4 for the Z-Y plane. In Figure 6 b and c, the fixed states are the orthogonal
states 1
4
(I + X ⊗ X) and 1
4
(I − X ⊗ X) for both the Z-X and X-Y planes. The
oscillations between the fixed orthogonal states show that some information about
the dealer’s qubit remains in the joint state of two players and depends on the plane
the qubit is encoded into. We quantify the amount of information in this adjacent
pair using the mutual information of the state shared by the dealer and the pair,
measuring a value of I = 0.29 ± 0.02. This value is obtained from a three-qubit
state tomography. On the other hand, when the players are opposite they obtain
no information in the Z-X plane, but can extract information in the Z-Y and X-Y
planes. In Figure 6 g-i we show the experimental results from the player pair (1,2).
In Figure 6 h the fixed state is 1
4
(I+X⊗X) for the Z-X plane, while in Figure 6 g
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and i, the fixed states are the orthogonal states 1
4
(I +X ⊗X + (Z ⊗ Y + Y ⊗ Z))
and 1
4
(I +X ⊗X − (Z ⊗ Y + Y ⊗Z))/4 for both the Z-Y and X-Y planes. Again,
the oscillations between the fixed orthogonal states show that some information
about the dealer’s qubit remains in the joint state of two players. In this case, the
mutual information of the state shared by the dealer and the pair is measured to
be I = 0.62± 0.02, obtained from three-qubit state tomography.
To elevate the secret sharing QQ scenario to a threshold scheme, i.e. one where
no two players can obtain any information, we use a hybrid protocol48,49. In this
class of protocols, any (k, k′, n) ramp scheme can be elevated to a (k, n) threshold
scheme, and in fact all intermediate ramp schemes (k, k′′, n) for any k′ ≤ k′′ ≤
k − 1 can be achieved. In our case we can elevate the (3,1,4) ramp scheme to
a (3,4) threshold scheme. The hybrid scheme uses, in addition to the QQ ramp
scheme, a quantum one-time pad and classical secret sharing. That is, before the
encoding the dealer applies a randomly chosen Pauli operation so that the state
encoded is XxZz |ψ〉, where x, z are randomly chosen bits by the dealer. This
state is then encoded and distributed, and the classical information x, z is shared
using classical secret sharing with ramp scheme parameters (k, k′′, n). Without
the classical information the players will never be able to retrieve |ψ〉, but with
the classical information, any k can still access the information perfectly. In the
present case, if the classical information is distributed using a classical (2, 4) secret
sharing scheme, no two players can know its value. We check the performance of
the hybrid protocol experimentally by applying randomly the operators I, X, Z
and XZ to the dealer’s qubit and measuring the resulting state of the pairs of
players. In Figure 6 d-f we show the fidelity of the adjacent player’s shared state
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with respect to the fixed state I/4 and in Figure 6 j-l we show the fidelity of the
opposite player’s shared state with respect to the fixed state 1
4
(I + X ⊗ X). One
can see that when the dealer applies the hybrid encoding protocol, the information
is almost completely removed from the state shared by pairs of players, as shown
by the fidelities remaining constant over the angles of the planes.
For any set of three players the encoding in Eq. (4) allows them to access the
quantum secret perfectly. For example, if players 2 and 4 measure in Z2 and X4
respectively, the graph state is projected to one where the quantum secret resides
on the qubit of player 1 (up to a correction operation Xs2(ZX)s4Z). The same is
possible for any three players by symmetry. Thus, for the QQ protocol all three
sets can access the secret. The same is true for the hybrid protocol, since the
classical information of the one-time pad will be known by any set of three players
and can easily be undone. In Figure 7 we show the results from our generated
graph state when the set of players (1,2,4) and (2,3,4) work to uncover the secret
qubit shared by the dealer. Here, the designated player who retrieves the secret
qubit is player 1 in Figure 7 a and player 4 in Figure 7 b. We again treat the
mapping from the dealer to the designated player as a quantum channel and carry
out quantum process tomography. One can see that in both sets of three players
the secret quantum information is retrieved, although with some deformation of the
Bloch sphere caused by the non-ideal graph state used in our experiment. However,
the average fidelity for the shared qubit remains high with F¯1 = 0.82 ± 0.01 and
F¯4 = 0.81± 0.01.
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Secure quantum secret sharing (SQQ)
Finally, we introduce and demonstrate a new protocol for sharing a quantum secret
over untrusted channels between the dealer and the players, which we denote by
SQQ (for secure QQ). This is performed here for a (3, 4) threshold scheme, its
extension to general access structures will be presented in ref.51. The QQ protocol
and the hybrid protocol work as long as the state used for encoding is the same
as (or close to) that given in Eq. (1). However, if the channel from the dealer to
the players is noisy or untrusted, this may not be the case. Thus, without knowing
the initial secret that was sent, an authorised set of players cannot verify if they
received it correctly or not. The SQQ protocol rectifies this problem by verifying
that the state used is indeed that in Eq. (1), or close to it. Here, CQ measurements
are used as a subprotocol to test the resource state (in a similar way to how a GHZ
state can be tested using the verification protocol recently presented in ref.52).
The protocol works as follows: after generating and distributing the state, the
dealer decides either to test it, or use it for quantum secret sharing, with probability
s and 1 − s, respectively. The dealer announces the choice about whether to test
or use it publicly, and the dealer and players carry out their part of the test or
the secret sharing scheme, respectively. The test is essentially an adapted version
of the CQ protocol, which by checking the correlations verifies the state is the one
desired. In the test, the dealer measures in either X, Y or Z, or does not make any
measurement, all with equal probability. They then announce their choice and the
results publicly. A set of players B which are checking the state, then do measure-
ments depending on the dealer’s measurement choice. The measurements used by
17
the sets of three players are explicitly detailed below, along with a description of
how the level of security is quantified.
It can be shown (see Methods) that if a given state ρ shared between the
dealer and players is used for secret sharing and the state ω that is retrieved by an
authorised set of players has fidelity f = 〈ψ|ω|ψ〉 with respect to the secret state
|ψ〉, then the probability P that the state ρ passes the CQ test is related to the
fidelity by
f ≥ 2P − 1. (6)
In other words, a state which passes the test with high probability will give a high
fidelity when used for sharing the secret.
Furthermore, if we call Cf the event that the protocol has not aborted and
that the state ρ was used for QQ, then we also show in the Methods that the
probability P (Cf ) of this event satisfies f ≥
(
1− 2s
P (Cf )
)1/2
. Thus, if the test is
passed in the cases when the dealer announces they should test, then the players
can be confident that when the dealer announces they should instead use the state,
the secret quantum information retrieved will be of high fidelity.
As an example for our experimental graph state, we consider the set of players
(1, 2, 3), with the same holding for all sets by symmetry. The measurements for the
test correspond to randomly measuring one of the following operators Z0Z1Z2X3,
Y0Y1Z2I3, Y0Z1Y2I3, X0X1I2X3, X0I1X2X3, I0X1X2I3 or Z0Y1Y2X3 (see Methods).
The test is passed if the measurement results for these operators are +1, +1, +1,
−1, −1, +1 and −1, respectively. Based on the measured expectation values for
these operator settings, in Figure 8 a we show the probability of our experimental
state passing the test and in Figure 8 b we show the corresponding lower bounds on
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the fidelity, which are consistent with the fidelities measured previously in Figure 7.
Thus, using the verified protocol we find that the probability of passing the test is
fully consistent with the previously measured fidelity of the retrieved states for the
three players.
Discussion
In this work we experimentally demonstrated the use of multipartite entangled
graph states for classical (CQ) and quantum (QQ) secret sharing. We used a pho-
tonic setup to generate a five-qubit graph state and carried out the encoding, sharing
and retrieval of classical and quantum secrets. In the CQ protocol we demonstrated
the ability of the graph to share a classical random key, which can be used to se-
curely share classical secrets, with an access structure of a (3, 1, 4) ramp scheme.
Here, the secret is shared between four players, such that any three can perfectly
access the secret, yet no single player obtains any information at all. The QQ
protocol achieves the same access structure for a quantum secret. However, with
the integration of classical and quantum protocols, this access structure was then
elevated to a (3, 4) threshold scheme for sharing a quantum secret, i.e. any three
players can access the secret, but fewer have no information. This hybrid QQ pro-
tocol is a combination of classical secret sharing and the QQ protocol, which allows
us to achieve an access structure known to be impossible with QQ alone. We also
introduced and demonstrated a new protocol for sharing a quantum secret over un-
trusted channels, which we call SQQ. Taken together with the hybrid QQ protocol
this highlights the power of integrating tasks using the graph state approach and
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enables us to achieve protocol parameters and security not possible with any single
protocol. As more sophisticated ways of using graph states emerge, combining and
demonstrating different sub-protocols in the way we have done here will become
increasingly more relevant. The facility and flexibility of graph states for different
quantum information processing tasks clearly propels them forward as a technology
with great potential for future quantum networks.
Methods
Experimental setup
The PCF sources used in the experiment are similar to those described in refs.53,54.
When pumped by picosecond pulses from a Ti:Sapphire laser at 724nm on the slow
birefringent axis of the PCF, spontaneous four-wave mixing produces signal-idler
photon pairs at 625nm and 860nm, polarized on the fast axis of the fibre. The cross-
polarized phasematching scheme takes advantage of a turning point in the signal
wavelength where it is locally independent of the pump wavelength, which has the
effect of avoiding correlations between the signal and idler’s spectra. This allows
quantum interference to take place between photons from separate sources without
the need for tight spectral filtering, which would reduce the collection efficiency.
To produce signal-idler pairs in a polarization Bell state, the PCF is set up
in a Sagnac loop around a PBS and pumped in both directions. The axes of
the fibre are twisted so that in the clockwise direction around the loop, the pho-
ton pairs polarized on the fast-axis emerge horizontally polarized, while for the
counter-clockwise direction, photon-pairs emerge vertically polarized. When the
two directions are recombined at the PBS, all the photon-pairs exit through the
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same output, so that the state of a single pair in this beam is in a superposition
1√
2
(
|HH〉s1,i1 + eiθ |V V 〉s1,i1
)
, where the phase θ between the two directions can
be tuned to zero using a birefringent compensator placed in the pump beam before
the loop.
The other PCF source is pumped in a single direction so as to produce pairs
without polarization entanglement. The idler is detected as a heralding photon
while the signal photon is rotated to diagonal polarization 1√
2
(|H〉s2 + |V 〉s2). This
is then overlapped at the fusion PBS with the signal photon from the other source
and we postselect events for the cases where one signal emerges from each PBS
output. This implies that the two signal photons have the same polarization, or
are in an even parity state, so that they have either both been transmitted or
both been reflected at the PBS. The conditioned state is a three photon GHZ
state 1√
2
(
|HHH〉s1,i1,s2 + |V V V 〉s1,i1,s2
)
, which is converted to a linear graph state
1√
2
(|+0+〉+ |−1−〉) by waveplate rotations applied to the signal modes.
Each signal photon is then launched into a displaced Sagnac interferometer.
Here, they are split at the PBS surface of the hybrid beamsplitters, and we label
the transmitted paths the |0〉 states of the path qubits, and the reflected paths the
|1〉 states. This results in the five-qubit state:
1
2
√
2
(
|00〉pol,path + |11〉pol,path
)
s1
|0〉i1
(
|00〉path,pol + |11〉path,pol
)
s2
+ 1
2
√
2
(
|00〉pol,path − |11〉pol,path
)
s1
|1〉i1
(
|00〉path,pol − |11〉path,pol
)
s2
,
(7)
which is locally equivalent to a linear graph state and the target resource state,
which can be written as:
1
2
√
2
(|++〉12 + i |−−〉12) |−y〉0 (|++〉34 + i |−−〉34)
+ 1
2
√
2
(|++〉12 − i |−−〉12) |+y〉0 (|++〉34 − i |−−〉34) ,
(8)
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where the eigenstates of the Pauli Y operator are |±y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i |1〉). The re-
quired local rotations are implemented by relabelling the transmitted and reflected
interferometer paths to |+〉 and |−〉, applying HWP rotations to the signal polar-
izations, and a QWP rotation to the idler. Tilted glass plates in each path are used
for the relative phase-shifts in the interferometers.
In order to experimentally implement the removal or tracing out of a path qubit
(corresponding player does not take part in the secret sharing), the glass plate was
removed from one path, so that the two path-lengths would differ by more than a
coherence length. Hence the paths are incoherently recombined at the BS surface
before going to polarization analysis. This allowed the photon’s polarization to still
be detected, but no information was gained about the path. On the other hand, to
remove a polarization qubit, the PBS was taken away from the polarization analysis,
so that the path information was still detected, but no polarization information was
measured.
The two-fold coincidence rates collected from individual sources were around
9000 per second. Four-fold coincidences where the fusion succeeded, between the
three entangled photons and the one herald photon, were ∼ 0.25 per second. Gen-
erating entanglement relies upon the signal photons from separate sources being
indistingishable when they are overlapped at the PBS, otherwise the fusion can
only leave an incoherent mix of possibilities44. When the relative arrival time of
the signal photons was varied, with the measurement bases set appropriately, an
anti-dip was seen at zero-delay with visibility ∼ 62%. This indicates there are some
distinguishability issues which will degrade the quality of the state, which mainly
result from inhomogenity along the length of the PCF sources.
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Resource characterisation
For the five-qubit graph state we use the following entanglement witness on qubits
0, 1, 2, 3, and 4
W = 9
4
I − 1
8
(X˜X˜IIX˜ + X˜X˜IX˜I + IX˜X˜X˜X˜ + IX˜X˜II + X˜IX˜IX˜ + X˜IX˜X˜I
+IIIX˜X˜)− 1
4
(IZY˜ Y˜ Z + Y˜ ZY˜ II + Y˜ IIY˜ Z), (9)
where O˜ corresponds to measurements in the O basis with the eigenstates swapped.
This is a locally rotated version of the witness given in ref.46 for a five-qubit linear
cluster state and takes into account the required local complementation opera-
tions43.
To obtain the fidelity for the five-qubit graph state we decompose the fidelity
operator into a summation of products of Pauli matrices as
F = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| = 1
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(1 + IXXII −XXIXI −XIXXI −XXIIX −XIXIX
+IIIXX + IXXXX +XY Y Y Y + Y ZY II + Y ZY XX + Y Y ZII
+Y Y ZXX −XZZY Y − ZY Y XI − ZY Y IX − ZXIY Y − ZIXY Y
+ZZZXI + ZZZIX + Y IIZY + Y XXZY + IZY ZY + IY ZZY
+Y IIY Z + Y XXY Z + IZY Y Z + IY ZY Z −XY Y ZZ +XZZZZ
+ZXIZZ + ZIXZZ). (10)
Calculating the expectation value of this operator requires 17 unique measurement
bases: XXXXX, Y XXY Z, Y XXZY , ZXXY Y , ZXXZZ, XY Y Y Y , XY Y ZZ,
ZY Y XX, Y Y ZY Z, XY ZZY , Y Y ZXX, Y ZY Y Z, ZZY ZY , Y ZY XX, XZZY Y ,
XZZZZ and ZZZXX.
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Classical secret sharing
It can be seen by inspection of Eq. (1) that the reduced density matrix of any player
a is ρi,ja = I/2 for all basis choices j and results i of the dealer’s measurements.
From this it can easily be checked that χ(j) = 0 for all bases j. Hence, no single
party can obtain any information.
For a pair of players (a, b) that are adjacent, one can easily check from Eq. (1)
that ρi,ja,b = I/4, j = Z, Y . Hence, no information can be extracted and χ(j) = 0
for all bases j. For a pair of players (a, b) that are opposite it can easily be seen
from Eq. (1) that for j = Y they can access the result by measuring one qubit
in Y and the other in Z. Hence, χ(Y ) = 1. It can also be shown that ρ
i,Z
a,b =
(1/2)(|+ +〉〈+ + |+ | −−〉〈−− |) for both results i, so that no information can be
extracted and χ(Z) = 0
Any triplet of players can access the secret, as discussed in the results section,
which can be seen by inspection of Eqs. (1) and (2).
Quantum secret sharing
Here we derive the access structure of the QQ protocol. The first step in the protocol
is that the dealer generates and distributes the state in Eq. (1). We rewrite the
state as follows
1√
2
(|0〉0|φ〉1234 + |1〉0|φ′〉1234). (11)
This is used to teleport a secret state |ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 to the players. The dealer
measures the secret qubit and their part of the state in Eq. (11) in the Bell basis and
announces the results publicly. In the retrieval step the authorised sets then apply
the appropriate correction and the decoding operations. To study the accessibility
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of the quantum information we ignore the correction step and assume it is always
the good result where no correction is required - if a set of players cannot access the
secret for the corrected state, then they cannot access it for the uncorrected state.
Similarly, if they can, knowing the results of the dealer’s measurement allows them
to do the correction afterwards. Thus, consider the secret teleported to the players,
giving the state
α|φ〉1234 + β|φ′〉1234 =
(|+〉1|+〉2|0〉3(α|0〉4 − β|1〉4) + |+〉1|+〉2|1〉3(α|1〉4 − β|0〉4)
+|−〉1|−〉2|0〉3(α|1〉4 + β|0〉4) + |−〉1|−〉2|1〉3(α|0〉4 + β|1〉4)
)
/4. (12)
Note that this state is cyclically symmetric amongst the four players, according to
the symmetry of the graph, in this case a square. It can be seen from Eq. (12) that
any single player a has the reduced density matrix ρa = I/2, thus they cannot access
any information. This is quantified by considering the reduced state of Eq. (11) for
ρ0a = I/4, so that the mutual information I(ρ0a) = 0.
For two adjacent players a and b we have from Eq. (12)
ρab =
1
2
( |0〉a 〈0| ⊗ (XZ |ψ〉b 〈ψ|ZX + Z |ψ〉b 〈ψ|Z)
+ |1〉a 〈1| ⊗ (X |ψ〉b 〈ψ|X + |ψ〉b 〈ψ|)
)
. (13)
From this we find that they can obtain some information as follows: player a mea-
sures in the Z basis (the result of which we denote sa), and then tells player b the
outcome. Player b then performs the correction Z1⊕sa and we are left with the
state on player b as ρb = (X |ψ〉b 〈ψ|X + |ψ〉b 〈ψ|) /2. Thus in some cases the full
information can be retrieved and in other cases only partially, depending on the
secret shared. For example, if the secret state is |±〉 then full information can be
retrieved.
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On the other hand, after teleportation two opposite players a and b share the
state
ρab = |A〉ab 〈A|+ |B〉ab 〈B|+ i sin(θ) sin(φ) (|A〉ab 〈B| − |B〉ab 〈A|) , (14)
where |A〉 = (|++〉ab + |−−〉ab)/
√
2, |B〉 = (|++〉ab − |−−〉ab)/
√
2, and we take
the standard Bloch sphere parameterisation of the input qubit α = cos(θ/2) and
β = eiφ sin(θ/2). The players can retrieve information as follows: player a measures
in the Z basis, obtaining result sa, and player b performs the correction operation
Zsa⊕1b . The resulting state is ρb = (ZX |ψ〉b 〈ψ|XZ + |ψ〉b 〈ψ|) /2. Thus in some
cases the full information can be retrieved and in other cases only partially, de-
pending on the secret shared. For example, if the secret state is |±y〉 then full
information can be retrieved.
For three players, it can easily be seen from the decomposition of Eq. (11) that
if player 2 measures Z2 and player 4 measures X4, the secret can be retrieved on the
qubit of player 1 up to feedforward operations Xs2(XZ)s4Z. Similar results hold
for all sets of three players by symmetry of the graph state.
Hybrid Quantum secret sharing
After the random application of the operators I, X, Z and XZ based on the results
of a one-time pad, as well as the QQ encoding teleportation stage, the state of the
players is
1√
2
XxLZ
z
L (α|φ〉1234 + β|φ′〉1234) , (15)
where XL = Z1Z2X3I4 and ZL = Z1Z2Z3Z4. From the arguments in the previous
section, players who cannot access the quantum secret in the QQ case cannot access
it in this case too. However, players also cannot access anything when they do not
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know the values x and z. This can be checked by looking at the reduced density
matrices mixed over the values of x and z. Thus, any two players not knowing
x and z obtain no information, but any three knowing x and z can access the
secret state perfectly. Sharing the classical information of x and z via a (3, 4)
Shamir-Blakely14,15 classical secret sharing scheme achieves this exactly. Note, we
are assuming authenticated classical channels, as in all our schemes. However, to use
the Shamir-Blakely14,15 secret sharing scheme one also requires a trusted channel.
If one does not trust the classical channels one could use a CQ scheme to send this
information, or indeed the Shamir-Blakely scheme plus multiple standard two party
QKD.
Secure quantum secret sharing details
We now present the verified SQQ protocol and its proof in more detail. We exemplify
the protocol for our state with accessing set B = (1, 2, 3). The same steps can be
performed by symmetry for all sets of three players.
1. The dealer distributes the players’ qubits of the entangled graph state, i.e.
the channel state in Eq. (1).
2. The dealer randomly decides that they will carry out: (a) the protocol CQBtest,
or (b) the QQ protocol, with probabilities s and 1 − s respectively, and an-
nounces the choice to all players.
(a) CQBtest defined for an authorised set B = (1, 2, 3).
i. The dealer chooses randomly which of the seven measurements below
should be performed for the test, announcing the choice and results
of their part of the measurement (in the case where they are asked
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to measure I0 they output the result +1).
M1 = Z0Z1Z2X3
M2 = Y0Y1Z2I3
M3 = Y0Z1Y2I3
M4 = −X0X1I2X3
M5 = −X0I1X2X3
M6 = I0X1X2I3
M7 = −Z0Y1Y2X3
The minus signs can be interpreted as meaning that the product of
outputs should ideally be minus one.
ii. To comply, players in B perform their parts of the measurement
chosen by the dealer. They then check their correlations by com-
municating amongst themselves. If the product of outcomes of the
dealer and all B is 1 (or −1 according to the sign of the measure-
ment), they give the response “pass”, otherwise “fail”.
iii. If “pass” is returned, proceed again to step 1 of the protocol, other-
wise abort.
(b) Carry out standard QQ defined for the authorised set B = (1, 2, 3)
i. The dealer measures the quantum secret and their part of the shared
channel state in the Bell basis and announces the result.
ii. Players B perform the corrections and decoding operation.
We now give a proof of the security for the QSS protocol, i.e. we prove the fidelity
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bounds with respect to passing the test. Carrying out the protocol CQBtest as defined
above for players (1, 2, 3) is equivalent to performing a POVM {Mpass,Mfail}, where
Mpass is the sum of all the +1 projections for the measurements performed in the
CQBtest, which can easily be seen to give
Mpass =
∑
i
Mi + I
2
=
I + Γ
2
, (16)
where Γ = (|g〉0123〈g|+ I0Z1Z2Z3|g〉0123〈g|I0Z1Z2Z3) is the projection onto a space
where the QQ protocol works perfectly, and |g〉0123 is the graph state of the subgraph
of qubits 0, 1, 2 and 3. The probability P of passing the CQtest, given a state ρ, is
then given by
P = Tr(ρMpass) =
1 + Tr(ρΓ)
2
. (17)
Consider ρ is now used instead to share a quantum secret |ψ〉 via the QQ
protocol. If we denote f = 〈ψ|ω|ψ〉 the fidelty of the decoded state ω, then it
follows that f ≥ Tr(ρΓ), since any state in the subspace Γ perfectly transports
the secret, so the final fidelity can only be higher than the overlap with this space,
giving Eq. (6).
Following the logic in ref.52, if we denote Cf the event that the certified pro-
tocol has not aborted and that the state ρ was used for QQ such that it returns a
decoded state with fidelity f with the original secret, then it can be shown that the
probability P (Cf ) of this event satisfies
P (Cf ) ≤ 2s
(1− f 2) . (18)
This implies that if the test passes, then the fidelity of the output state is high.
This relationship is demonstrated in the results section. A generalisation of this
protocol, with a more detailed and general proof can be found in ref.51.
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Figure 1. Experimental setup. a, Setup used to generate the graph state re-
source for secret sharing. Two photonic crystal fibre sources are pumped using a
Ti:Sapphire laser producing picosecond pulses at 724 nm. The first source pro-
duces a pair of photons in the state |H〉i1 |H〉s1 and the second produces photons
in the state 1√
2
(|H〉i2 |H〉s2 + |V 〉i2 |V 〉s2). The signal photons from the first pair are
rotated to the state |+〉 using a half-wave plate (HWP) and both signal photons
are then fused using a polarizing beamsplitter. The polarizations of the signal
photons are then rotated using HWPs to form the three-qubit linear cluster state
1√
2
(|+〉s1 |H〉i2 |+〉s2 + |−〉s1 |V 〉i2 |−〉s2), where the first idler photon is used as a
trigger to verify a four-fold coincidence signifying the generation of the state. The
path degree of freedom of the signal photons is then used to expand the resource
to a five-qubit linear cluster state using a Sagnac interferometer, as shown in the
dashed boxes and explained in the main text. Local complementation operations
are then carried out in order to rotate the linear cluster into the graph state shown
in panel b, as detailed in ref.43. b, Diagram of the secret sharing scenario. Here,
the vertices correspond to qubits initialized in the state |+〉 and edges correspond
to controlled-phase gates, CZ = diag(1, 1, 1,−1), applied to the qubits.
Figure 2. Classical secret sharing using a quantum resource - single player.
a, Accessible information χ for single players when the dealer measures in Z.
b, Accessible information χ for single players when the dealer measures in Y .
In both panels it is clear that when acting alone the players have almost zero
information about the state the dealer has prepared. All error bars in the figures
are calculated using a Monte Carlo method with Poissonian noise on the count
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statistics45.
Figure 3. Classical secret sharing using a quantum resource - two play-
ers. a (c), Accessible information χ for pairs of adjacent (opposite) players when
the dealer measures in Z. b (d), Accessible information χ for pairs of adjacent
(opposite) players when the dealer measures in Y . From the panels it is clear
that only opposite players have some information about the state the dealer has
prepared when the dealer measures in the Y basis.
Figure 4. Classical secret sharing using a quantum resource - three play-
ers. a-d, Average quantum bit error rate (QBER) for the bit retrieved by the
three player triplets when working together, with the bit retrieved by a designated
player. For the designated player, the measured bit outcomes are correlated in
the same bases as the dealer (ideally zero QBER) and uncorrelated in the oppo-
site bases (ideally 50% QBER).
Figure 5. Quantum secret sharing - one player. Single-qubit Bloch spheres
for individual players. Here, each Bloch sphere represents the output qubit states
for an arbitrary state encoded by the dealer. a, Original Bloch sphere of states
encoded by the dealer. b, Player 1 Bloch sphere. c, Player 2 Bloch sphere. d,
Player 3 Bloch sphere. e, Player 4 Bloch sphere. One can see the Bloch spheres
all correspond to an almost completely mixed state I/2 for the dealer’s input
states. The corresponding mutual information shared between the dealer and
players 1, 2, 3 and 4 is I = 0.005± 0.001, 0.009± 0.002, 0.013± 0.003 and 0.009±
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0.003. The process fidelity of the channel describing the mapping of the dealer’s
states to the players states is given by55 Fp = (Tr
√√
χexpχid
√
χexp)
2, where χid
is an ideal maximally mixed channel and χexp is the experimentally reconstructed
one. From this definition we obtain process fidelities of 0.989±0.002, 0.973±0.043,
0.980 ± 0.005, and 0.975 ± 0.056 for players 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Thus, in
the one player case, the players have almost no information about the state the
dealer has shared using the graph state.
Figure 6. Quantum secret sharing - two players. Fidelities with respect to fixed
reference states for the two-qubit states shared by two players as the dealer en-
codes qubit states into the graph along three orthogonal Bloch sphere planes
Z-Y , Z-X and X-Y (parameterized by the canonical angles θ and φ). a-f, Fi-
delities for adjacent players (1 and 4), with panels a-c showing the standard
encoding scheme, where the mutual information between the dealer and the pair
of players is I = 0.29± 0.02. Panels d-f show the hybrid encoding scheme used
to remove information in all three planes. g-l, Fidelities for opposite players (1
and 2), with panels a-c showing the standard encoding scheme, where the mu-
tual information between the dealer and the pair of players is I = 0.62± 0.02 and
panels d-f showing the hybrid encoding scheme. The fixed reference states in
the panels are as follows: In a, d, e and f, the fixed state is I/4. In b and c,
the fixed states are the orthogonal states 1
4
(I + X ⊗X) (red) and 1
4
(I −X ⊗X)
(blue). In h, j, k and l, the fixed state is 1
4
(I + X ⊗ X). In g and i, the fixed
states are the orthogonal states 1
4
(I + X ⊗ X + (Z ⊗ Y + Y ⊗ Z)) (red) and
1
4
(I + X ⊗ X − (Z ⊗ Y + Y ⊗ Z))/4 (blue). The oscillations between the fixed
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orthogonal states show that some information about the dealer’s qubit remains
in the joint state of two players - depending on the plane the qubit is encoded
into and quantified by the mutual information values I. However, when the dealer
applies the hybrid encoding, the information is almost completely removed as
shown by the fidelities remaining constant over the angles of the planes.
Figure 7. Quantum secret sharing - three players. a, Bloch sphere of an
arbitrary qubit shared by the dealer to players 1, 2 and 4, with the secret residing
on the qubit of player 1. The average fidelity for a shared qubit is F¯ = 0.82±0.01.
b, Bloch sphere for players 2, 3 and 4, with the secret residing on the qubit of
player 4. The average fidelity for a shared qubit in this case is F¯ = 0.81± 0.01. In
both, the spheres are slightly squashed due to the non-ideal graph state resource
used in the experiment.
Figure 8. Verified quantum secret sharing protocol. a, Expected success
probabilities for the protocol being carried out between the dealer and different
sets (triplets) of three players. The success of the verified protocol (see text for
details) allows the dealer to verify the access structure of the graph resource and
carry out verified quantum secret sharing. b, Lower bound on the fidelity of the
state shared by the players with respect to the ideal graph state.
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